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JOINT CUSTODY AND PARENTS' LIABILITY
UNDER CIVIL CODE ARTICLE

2318

Introduction
Louisiana has followed the national trend in accepting joint custody
of minor children in divorce and separation proceedings as the norm rather
than the exception.' Many commentators have considered the sociological
implications of joint custody on the family environment, but the interaction of joint custody with other laws in Louisiana must also be considered.'
One potential conflict is the interaction of joint custody with Civil Code
article 2318, under which parents are responsible for the damage caused
by their minor children. 3 More specifically, the issue is under what circumstances a divorced or separated spouse under a joint custody plan
should be liable for damage caused by the minor child in the physical
custody of the other spouse.
To properly resolve this issue it is necessary to examine whether parental liability for the child's acts stems from a failure to supervise or correct the child, whether it arises purely out of the relationship between
the parent and child without regard to supervision or custody, or whether
it arises from the power of a parent to enforce his or her authority over
the child by demanding physical custody of the child.
The origin of paternal authority over the child, when that authority
terminates, the terms used in article 2318, and most importantly the influence of the articles surrounding article 2318 are major factors in determining how liability should be imposed on a parent under a joint custody
plan for damage caused by a minor child.
The Effects of Custody

The term "custody" is usually broken down into two components:
physical or "actual" custody and legal custody. A typical joint custody
plan will allocate time periods for physical custody between parents so
as to promote the sharing of the care and custody of the child in such
a way as to ensure the child of frequent and continuing contact with both
parents.'
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. Currently 32 states have some form of joint custody law. 52 U.S.L.W. 2191 (Oct.
4, 1983). Louisiana first adopted a joint custody provision in 1981. See 1981 La. Acts,
No. 283, § 1. For a list of 28 of these states and their corresponding statutes, see 9 Fam.
L. Rep. 4025 (July 19, 1983).
2. See Schulman, Second Thoughts on Joint Custody: Analysis of Legislation and
Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 538 (1981). It is beyond
the scope of this article to discuss in detail joint custody plans. The new joint custody
law has been analyzed in two excellent articles in previous issues of the Louisiana Law
Review. See Comment, Joint Custody in Louisiana, 43 La. L. Rev. 85 (1982) and Note,
Louisiana's New Joint Custody Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 759 (1983).
3. La. Civ. Code art. 2318, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 578, § 1.
4. La. Civ. Code art. 146(D).
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Legal custody, by contrast, has been defined as "the right or authority
of a parent or parents, to make decisions concerning the child's
upbringing." 5 Under the typical joint custody plan, both parents remain
legal custodians of the child regardless of which parent has physical custody
of the child at a given time. Joint legal custody thus involves a sharing
of the responsibilities concerning the child including decisions about education, medical care, discipline and other matters relating to the upbringing
of the child. Joint legal custody is equated with tutorship in article 250,
which states that "if the parents are awarded joint custody of a minor
child, then the cotutorship of the minor child shall belong to both parents
with equal authority, privileges and responsibilities."6 This natural cotutorship includes tutorship over both the person and the property of the minor.
Origins of Paternal Responsibility
The code articles on paternal authority7 give parents many rights over
their children.' Foremost among these rights is the right of the parents
to demand the physical custody of the child and demand that the child
live in the parental home. 9 As a corollary, the parents must fulfill many
obligations including the responsibility for the damage their minor children
5. La. Civ. Code art. 146(D); see supra note 2; see also La. R.S. 13:1569(11) (1983).
Legal custody may be granted in several ways, including: (1) a public parental unfitness
action in juvenile court, La. R.S. 13:1580 (1983); (2) a habeaus corpus proceeding under
La. R.S. 9:291 while the parents are not living together, though not judicially separated,
La. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1983); (3) an incidental proceeding in a suit for separation or divorce
(custody pendente lite), La. Civ. Code art. 146 (Supp. 1984); and (4) a custody award granted
after a judgment of separation or divorce has been granted (permanent custody), La. Civ.
Code art. 157.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 250 (emphasis added).
7. Although the authority over minor children is given both to the mother and the
father, under Civil Code article 216 that authority is termed "paternal" since the father
prevails when there is disagreement between the parents concerning the child, and the father
unless interdicted or absent is given power to administer the child's estate under article
221. The term "paternal" is also an appendage of the Roman law concept that the pater
familias or father was the head and master of the Roman family. However, the words
"paternal" and "parental" are used synonymously. See 1 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil
Law pt. 2, no. 1637, at 15 (1lth ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
8. Examples of those rights or powers are found in article 218 (custody and correction), article 219 (appointment of tutors), article 220 (delegation of authority), article 221
(administration of child's estate), article 223 (enjoyment of usufruct over certain property
of the minor).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 218 declares that the: "unemancipated minor can not quit the
parental house without the permission of his father and mother, who have the right to
correct him, provided it be done in a reasonable manner." This is probably the reason
for article 39, under which the minor can have no other domicile than that of his father,
mother, or tutor. Planiol states "the custody of a child is the right of keeping it at one's
home. The father, guardian of his son, may force him to live at the paternal home, and
if necessary, have him brought there by the police." I M. Planiol, supra note 7, pt. 2,
no. 1660, at 29.
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cause. Article 237, the last article in the chapter on paternal authority,
states, "Fathers and mothers are answerable for the offenses or quasioffenses committed by their children, in the cases prescribed under the
title: Of Quasi-Contracts, and of Offenses and Quasi-Offenses. ' ' "0
The reference in article 237 leads to article 2318, which states:
The father and the mother and, after the decease of either, the
surviving parent, are responsible for the damage occasioned by
their minor or unemancipated children, residing with them, or
placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them
recourse against those persons.
The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors.'
Although article 2318 is placed in the chapter on offenses and quasioffenses, conceptually, through the reference in article 237, it is a correlative obligation arising out of paternal authority analogous to liability
imposed because of relationships between persons and other persons or
things in articles 2317 through 2322.12
That liability under article 2318 is based on a specific relationship
between parent and child is evident from the historical development of
article 2318. In Article 20 of the Projet du Gouvernement (1800)" (the
source of the present article 2318) and in the Louisiana Digest of 1808,
liability was imposed on the father and after his decease the mother for
the deliquency of their minor children.'" Furthermore, liability was imposed only if the parents could have prevented the delinquency and failed

10.
II.
12.

La. Civ. Code art. 237.
La. Civ. Code art. 2318, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 578, § I.
See infra text accompanying notes 46-68. As one court has stated, "paternal respon-

sibility is the consequence and offspring of the paternal authority." Coats v. Roberts, 35
La. Ann. 891, 892 (1883).
13. Projet du Gouvernement bk. III, tit. III, art. 20 (1800). Compare this with the
language in article 1384 of the Code Napoleon; see also I M. Planiol, supra note 7 pt.

1, no. 909-910, at 507-08.
14.

La. Digest of 1808 bk. 111, tit. IV, art 20. This article followed the language of

the Projet du Gouvernement but grouped several of the delict articles into one paragraph.
The Digest of 1808 reads as follows:
Art. 20.

Every person is responsible not only for the damage which he causes

by his own act, but also for that which is caused by the act of any person for
whom he is answerable, or by any thing which is in his keeping.

The father, and after the death of the husband, the mother is responsible for
the delinquency of their minor children.

Masters and principals are responsible for the delinquency of their servants and
agents in the functions in which they have employed them.
Institutions of youth or artisans are answerable for the delinquency of their
scholars or apprentices.

The above responsibility takes place only when the parents, masters or prin-
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to do so.'" When the code of 1825 was adopted, the word delinquency
was changed to damage and the exculpating clause was deleted.' 6 The
language in the 1825 code is identical to the first paragraph of the current article 2318.
The two changes in the language of the article depart from a requirement of parental fault and appear to create a species of vicarious liability
growing out of the parent-child relationship. Thus, a shift in policy to
financial recovery for an innocent victim without regard to parental supervision seems apparent." The deletion of the exculpating clause appears
to de-emphasize the significance of the right of the parent to demand
the physical custody of the minor child as a basis for imposing liability
on the parent. Arguably, under this analysis, the noncustodial parent under
a joint custody plan, who does not have the right to physical custody
for a certain period, could be liable for damage caused by the minor child
while in the physical custody of the other parent.
The case of Turner v. Bucher'" supports the conclusion that actual
physical custody of the child may be irrelevant to a determination of parental liability under article 2318. In Turner, the father was held liable for
the child's acts in the absence of fault on his part and without fault on
the part of a child below the age of discernment.' 9 The court in Turner.
held that the father was strictly liable for the nondiscerning child's act
if the child's act when judged by a normal standard would have been
negligent.2" The court departed from prior jurisprudence and ruled that
cipals could have prevented the delinquency and have failed to do it.
They are considered to have been able to prevent the delinquency when it was
committed through their neglect to watch over the conduct of those for whom
they are answerable, or when it was committed in their presence.
The owner of an animal is responsible for the trespass or damage that the animal
has caused, whether the animal was in his keeping or was strayed or runaway.
15. La. Digest of 1808 bk. 111, tit. IV, art. 20.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 2297 (1825). See discussion in Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d
270, 272 (La. 1975). Article 2299 of the 1825 code establishing responsibility of teachers,
artisans and others retained language exculpating them if they could not have prevented
the damage.
17. This shift in policy actually appears to be a return to the Roman view that the
paterfamiliaswas financially responsible for the delicts of children under his power regardless
of whether or not the father was at fault. Stone, Liability for Damage Caused by Minors:
A Comparative Study, 5 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1952); see also W. Buckland, A Textbook
of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 101 (1932).
18. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
19. Prior cases held the father liable regardless of fault on his part but required fault
on the part of the child. See Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934);
Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922); Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Quincy
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Frank v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 196 So. 2d 50 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Boutte v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 176 So.
2d 833 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Fabre v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 167 So. 2d 448
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Gott v. Scott, 199 So. 460 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
20. Turner, 308 So. 2d at 277. See also Ryle v. Potter, 413 So. 2d 649 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982).
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the "language [of article 2318] is clear and unambiguous that it was the
legislative intent to impose a sort of strict liability upon parents as a
responsibility flowing from paternal authority." "' The court reasoned that
[an innocent victim should not be denied .reparation if there
exists a source of financial responsibility; therefore, the parents
of an infant of tender years . . . should be required to respond
for the acts of those within their "garde" because of their legal
relation to and legal responsibility for these nondiscerning
persons.22

The decision in Turner is evidence that the basis for parental liability
under article 2318 is not a failure to control and supervise the child, since
the parent need not be at fault; rather the court considered the parent-

child relationship as paramount in determining liability. However, as will
be discussed below, the use of the word garde may imply that the right
to demand physical custody of the child, which is not available to a noncustodial parent under a joint custody plan, may also be a prerequisite
to parental liability.23
Termination of Paternal Authority
Since paternal authority is the conceptual basis of parental liability
under article 2318, the point at which paternal authority terminates
becomes important. While the marriage is still in existence, the regime
of paternal authority continues under article 2318, and if the father and
mother are still living both are answerable for the child's acts.2 ' If the

21. 308 So. 2d at 273 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 274. Turner labeled this paternal responsibility "a sort of strict liability,"
since when the child was below the age of discernment neither the parent nor the child
need have been at fault. The liability is certainly not "direct liability" because the parents
cannot escape liability by claiming they could not have prevented the act. Other cases have
termed the liability "vicarious" since the parents must answer for the acts of another, their
child who must have been negligent under an adult standard. See Deshotel v. Traveler Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971); Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, 252 La.
770, 214 So. 2d 138 (1968); Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 La. 246, 178
So. 2d 238 (1965); Audubon Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 430 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983);
Deshotel v. Cas. Reciprocal Exch., 350 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Guidry v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). One writer
has termed it strict vicarious liability. Note, Tort-Damage Caused By Minors Under the
Age of Discretion-Strict Vicarious Liability Imposed on Parents, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 1194,
1198 (1975).
23. For a discussion of garde, see infra text accompanying note 48.
24. The Louisiana legislature in the 1984 Regular Session amended article 2318 to provide for the liability of both the mother and the father for the damage occasioned by their
minor children. 1984 La. Acts No. 326 § 1. Prior to the 1984 amendment, article 2318
placed the liability upon the father, and not until his decease did the mother become liable.
The constitutionality of the prior language was questionable when viewed in light of the
equal protection clause. The legislature keenly perceived the constitutional issue and wisely
amended the article.
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mother and father are separated in fact without a judicial decree, the
jurisprudence has held that.paternal authority continues and the father
will remain liable for the minor's acts regardless of which parent has
physical custody.25 If the husband and wife are judicially separated or
divorced, paternal authority is terminated, and the regime of tutorship
6
begins.1
The regime of tutorship is the close equivalent of paternal authority
in that the tutor takes the place of the father. The tutor has the right
to demand the minor's custody in exchange for the responsibility for caring for his person and for properly rearing and educating the minor.27
This legal responsibility for supervising the child may be equated with
the garde of the child as discussed in Turner. Given these similarities2"
between paternal authority and tutorship, the tutors (father and mother
as cotutors under a joint custody plan) should share the primary responsibility for damage occasioned by the minor. Indeed, article 2318 states:
"[tihe same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors." 29
In essence, joint legal custody is designed to continue as nearly as
possible the same parental authority that existed before separation or
divorce as well as the joint authority and responsibility that is usually
taken from one parent and given to the other under a sole custody award.
However, the parent lacking physical custody under a joint custody plan
does not have the power to compel the minor to live with him, which
power the parent possesses under article 218 before separation or divorce
and presumably has under Code of Civil Procedure article 4261 after
separation or divorce and a sole custody award.
The jurisprudence has decided who bears responsibility for the minor's
acts under sole custody awards, and these cases may provide insight in
determining whether the parent without physical custody under a joint
custody plan should be held liable for the child's acts. In Flannigan v.
Valliant,3" the mother and father were divorced, terminating the father's
paternal authority, and the legal custody was granted to the mother. The

25. Deshotel v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 350 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
Since paternal authority is not suspended the father still has the right to demand physical
custody of the child.
26. La. Civ. Code arts 246, 250. Article 246 states: "The minor not emancipated is
placed under the authority of a tutor after the dissolution of the marriage of his father
and mother or the separation from bed and board of either one of them from the other."
The termination of the father's authority by separation or divorce assumes that a custody
award is made in the separation or divorce decree. See Guidry v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
27. La. Code Civ. P. art 4261. The tutor must also act as a prudent administrator
over the minor's property. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4262 (Supp. 1984).
28. One distinction is that the tutor does not enjoy a usufruct over the minor's property.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 2318.
30. 400 So. 2d 225 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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plaintiff, after being assaulted by the minor, sued both the mother and
father to recover damages under article 2318. At the time of the incident
the minor lived with neither the father nor the mother. The court held
that the mother was responsible for the child's acts as the natural tutor
of the minor, relieving the father of liability since his liability terminated
with the award of legal custody to the mother in the divorce decree."
If the reasoning of Flannigan is extended to joint custody plans, both
parents arguably should be held liable for the child's acts regardless of
which parent has physical custody of the child, since both parents, as
cotutors, remain legal custodians of the child.
However, the mother in Flannigan, as sole legal custodian of the child,
possessed the right to demand physical custody of the child at any time,
and thus imposition of liability upon her may well have been appropriate
even though her child did not live with her at the time of the child's
assault. The mother's liability may be derived from the same principle
that imposes the responsibility upon the father who has "placed [his
children] under the care of others" in article 2318. Under a typical joint
custody plan, by contrast, although both parents remain cotutors and legal
custodians of the child, a parent lacks the right to demand physical custody
of the child during the time period physical custody is assigned to the
other parent. The Flannigan court may not have contemplated the imposition of liability upon a tutor or legal custodian who does not have
the right to demand the physical custody of the child.
Imposition of liability upon a parent who has no power to discipline
the child by demanding his physical custody would be a harsh and arguably
inappropriate result. An analogy can be drawn to cases where either paternal authority or tutorship has been considered to be superseded and
suspended by some force or operation of law, thus relieving the parent
or tutor of responsibility under article 2318. In Redd v. Bohannon,32 the
issue presented was the liability of a mother, a Florida resident, for a
tort committed by her son, an unemancipated minor in the military. The
court concluded that even though the mother remained the tutor of the
child, she was not responsible for the child's acts since she had no legal
right to control the child. The court ruled that the liability of the parent
does not continue when the parental authority over the minor has been
destroyed or suspended by operation of law, as where the minor is inducted into the military.33 The court reasoned that the basis of parental

31. Id. at 227. But see Guidry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 534
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (husband and wife divorced; decree silent as to custody; father
remained liable); see also Frazer v. Day, 307 So. 2d 733 (La. 1975) (mother and father
legally separated; mother given legal custody; mother held liable), Tripoli v. Gurry, 187
So. 2d 540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
32. 166 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
33. Id. at 364. See Coats v. Roberts, 35 La. Ann. 891 (1883); Jackson v. Ratliff, 84
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liability is the parent's right to control and supervise the actions of the
minor in his legal custody. The courts have also ruled that parental authority may be suspended by the child's being temporarily called into service
4
as a member of a posse comitatus1
By analogy, the joint custody plan could be interpreted as a force
of law denying the noncustodial parent the right to demand physical

custody of the minor during the interval in which the other parent enjoys
physical custody. During this time period, the noncustodial parent has
no power to enforce disciplinary decisions and has no right to supervise
or control the child physically. Under the Redd analysis, the parent's liability as tutor and legal custodian might be considered to be suspended during the time interval that the other parent enjoys physical custody of the
child."
In a recent case the third circuit appeared to adopt the analysis in

Flannigan that the status of the parent in relation to the child is allimportant. In Audubon Insurance Co. v. Fuller,36 the mother and father
were divorced in Oklahoma, thus dissolving the marriage and terminating
paternal authority. The judgment awarded custody to the mother but also
stated that the father should have reasonable visitation rights and custody

for a period not to exceed three months per year. It is difficult to determine whether the custody plan involved was a joint custody plan giving

the parents shared legal custody and cotutorship of the child. When the
court granted "custody" to the father for three months annually, it
arguably meant physical custody rather than legal custody with its atten-

dant authorities and responsibilities. Audubon Insurance Company sued
the father with whom the minor was residing during the three month period
for damages caused when the child allegedly committed a burglary. The
trial court held the father liable for damages caused by the child. The
third circuit, in remanding the case to determine whether the father had

So. 2d 103 (La. App. Orl. 1955); Simmons v. Sorenson, 71 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1954); see also Toca v, Rojas, 152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922).
34. Coats v. Roberts, 35 La. Ann. 891 (1883). See also Frazer v. Day, 307 So. 2d
733, 735 (La. 1975); Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922); Watkins v. Cupit,
130 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). A possee comitatus is the entire population of
a parish above the age of fifteen which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain
cases, to aid him. Black's Law Dictionary 1046 (5th ed. 1979).
35. However, the decision in Turner may reach a contrary result by imposing strict
liability on the parent to insure the victim a source of financial responsibility, thus making
the right to physical custody irrelevant and instead basing liability on the relationship between the parent and child.
The analysis in Redd may be applied when custody has been granted pendente lite or
under La. R.S. 9:291 (1983). In these two cases paternal authority has not terminated because
no separation or divorce has occurred. See La. Civ. Code art. 246. However, a force of
law has taken the right to physical custody away from the father thus relieving him of
liability under article 2318.
36. 430 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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legal custody of the child,37 apparently adopted the Flannigan reasoning
that status, not physical custody, is the determining factor under article
2318. However, the court did not have to consider a situation such as
that in Redd, where a parent lost the right to demand physical custody,
because in Audubon the father had physical custody of the child. Thus,
Audubon, although helpful, did not address the undecided situation in
which the parent has legal custody as cotutor under a joint custody plan
but does not have physical custody or the right to demand physical
custody.
Statutory Construction of Civil Code Article 2318
The above conceptual analysis of paternal authority can be supported
by jurisprudential application of the specific language of article 2318. The
phrase "residing with," under which the father is held responsible for
the minor who resides with him, commonly means to "live, dwell, abide
or lodge"-suggesting a requirement of physical custody or simply
residence. 8 Given this definition, under a joint custody plan one would
look to see which parent the child was presently living with in order to
determine liability. However, a problem arises when the child actually lives
with neither parent or when the minor commits an act when an intermediary such as an aunt or uncle is transporting the minor from one
parent to another for a change in physical custody.
In Toca v. Rojas," the Louisiana Supreme Court departed from this
literal interpretation and decided that the residence of the minor referred
to in article 2318 is the legal residence or domicile of the minor, which
according to the civil code is the domicile of the father (during marriage)
or tutor (after termination of paternal authority)."0 The court stressed that
the imputation of domicile was derived from the paternal authority over
the child, which could not be divested volntarily by the father but only
by some force or operation of law.' Hence, the imposition of liability
based on legal residence of the minor hinges upon parental authority during marriage and legal custody or tutorship after separation or divorce.
Thus, under a joint custody plan, both parents arguably should be held
liable as cotutors of the child.
However, at the time this case was decided, it probably was not contemplated that a parent or tutor would not have the right to physical
custody of the child. Thus, under a joint custody plan, where the noncustodial parent has no right to physical custody, an imputation of legal
domicile to that parent might well be inappropriate.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Black's Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979).
152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922).
Id.at 324, 93 So. at 110; La. Civ. Code art. 39.
Id.at 325-26, 93 So. at 110.
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Article 146 allows the plan for joint custody to provide for the
"designation of the child's legal domicile." 2 By designating the domicile
of the minor, the parents may be able to shift the responsibility for the
child's acts to either the father or the mother. However, the courts are
more likely to find some other purpose for the provision, such as
designating the domicile to determine which school the child will attend.
The principle of Tocas v. Rojas, that "residing with" means legal
residence or domicile, provides a much easier criterion for determining
parental liability than mere physical custody of the child. A determination of physical custody hinges upon arbitrary factual findings such as
how long the child lived with one parent, where he kept his clothing and
with whom he ate most of his meals. If liability is determined solely by
whether the child comes under the parent's paternal or tutorial authority,
these factual problems can be avoided.
The text of article 2318, which holds the parent liable for the minor's
acts while residing with him or "placed by them under the care of other
persons," 3 may provide a method by which the courts could hold the
noncustodial parent liable for the minor's acts. Under a joint custody
plan it may be argued that the noncustodial parent has voluntarily placed
the care of the child with the other spouse and thus should not be relieved
from the responsibility for the child. However, in a joint custody plan
the spouse is ordered by a court to place the child in the care of the
other spouse for a certain period of time, although the noncustodial spouse
remains a cotutor of the child. It should be noted that the parents may
voluntarily agree to a particular joint custody plan which is then incorporated into the court's judgment." However, once the court renders the
judgment, the allocation of custody has the force and effect of law which
cannot be voluntarily revoked by the parents. As discussed above, this
involuntary, court-ordered assignment of custody to the other spouse may
suspend the liability of the parent lacking physical custody.
As discussed above, the phrase "[tihe same responsibility attaches to
the tutors of minors"4 " indicates that responsibility should be placed upon
tutors where the power of the tutor is substituted for paternal authority
after paternal authority is terminated by separation or divorce. Article
2318 adds no qualifying statement, indicating that the liability should be
imposed as though paternal authority were still in existence. Significantly,
the last sentence of article 2318 imposes liability upon both cotutors (for
example, under a joint custody plan) simultaneously after the marriage
42. La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(1)(a), as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 695, § 1, provides in part: "The plan may also include such considerations as the following: (a) Designations of the child's legal domicile."
43. La. Civ. Code art. 2318, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 578, § 1.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 146.
45. La. Civ. Code art. 2318, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 578, § 1.
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ends and the regime of tutorship commences; the liability of one tutor
(mother) does not depend upon the prior death of the other (father).
Analogy to Surrounding Articles-Article 2317
The articles surrounding Article 2318 may be a helpful guide in determining parental liability for children under a joint custody plan. Article
2317 introduces the following articles by stating that liability attaches for
damage caused by "persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things
which we have in our custody." 6 Article 2317 creates two categories: (1)
damage caused by things (things generally in article 2317, animals in article 2321 and buildings in article 2322) and (2) damage caused by persons
(minors in article 2318, insane persons in article 2319 and servants,
scholars, and apprentices in article 2320). Notably, the requirement of
custody in article 2317 literally applies only to things and not to persons.
Thus, under article 2318, which illustrates the concept of article 2317 that
certain persons are "answerable" for other persons, liability may be based purely on the relationship between the parent or tutor and the child,
and physical custody of the child under a joint custody plan or otherwise
nay be irrelevant to determining parental liability. The concept of imposing liability upon one who is "answerable" for another arguably contemplates strict or vicarious liability based upon a specific relationship
between persons rather than upon custody or control.
However, the jurisprudence has not distinguished between persons and
things in applying the concept of custody. Indeed, the court in Turner
held the father responsible for the child's act because he had the "garde"
over the child."' Since Turner employs the concept of garde in explaining
parental liability for minors' torts, the articles attaching liability to those
who have garde over a thing may give some insight in determining who
should bear liability under article 2318 in the context of a joint custody
plan.
Loescher v. Parr,"' one of the leading cases on strict liability under
article 2317, defines the concept of garde in a footnote as "the things
in one's care ...to which one bears such a relationship as to have the
right of direction and control over them, and to draw some kind of benefit
from them."4 9 Analogizing things to children is a callous comparison,
but the.two may have some similarities. A definite relationship continues
between the joint legal custodian lacking physical custody and the child,
since under article 146 this parent retains the right to make decisions con-

46. La. Civ. Code art. 2317.
47. Turner, 308 So.2d at 275.
48. 324 So.2d 441 (La. 1975)
49. Id. at 449 n.7 (quoting Verlander, We Are Responsible, 2 Tulane Civil Law Forum
64 (1974)). See also Note, Things in One's Custody- Louisiana Civil Code Article 2317,
43 Tul. L. Rev. 907 (1969).
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cerning the child's upbringing even though under the particular joint
custody plan he may not enjoy physical custody of the child during certain extended intervals. This parent remains the cotutor of the child, and,
as discussed above, tutorship is the close equivalent of the parental authority that existed before the judgment of separation or divorce. Loescher
indicates that liability arises from this legal relationship to the person or
thing. 5"
However, the definition in Loescher also speaks of the owner's "right
of direction and control" over the thing. Under a joint custody plan the
legal custodian without physical custody retains the right to make decisions concerning the child's education, discipline and other related matters. It might be argued that these contacts constitute sufficient control
such that the noncustodial parent retains garde over the child and consequently liability. However, since the noncustodial parent has no right to
demand the physical custody of the child, he lacks the immediate physical
ability to enforce the disciplinary decisions. Arguably it would be improper
to impose strict liability upon a noncustodial parent who is unable to
demand physical custody of the child. This consideration in part justifies
the result in Redd v. Bohannon,5' discussed above. Although the mother
remained the tutor of the child, she had no right to demand his physical
custody to enforce that right of tutorship because her son was in the
military. Thus, she was appropriately relieved of liability for his torts.
In another footnote in Loescher, the court in dicta discussed the
possibility of retaining garde although the person has lost physical custody
of the thing. The court stated:
At this point, however, we should note that the English translation of "sous sa garde" as "in our custody" does not fully express
the concept of the "garde" of a thing-the legal responsibility
for its care or, keeping-,so that one may lose the custody of
a thing without losing its "garde." 52
This principle may be applied to persons: the parent may lose physical
custody of the child for a certain period of time under a joint custody
plan, but arguably, since that parent retains "legal custody" or "garde"
over the child, he should remain liable for the child's acts. Cases subsequent to Loescher have held that a lessor will under certain circumstances
retain garde and consequently liability under article 2317 when he leases
the thing to another person. 3 However, the courts, in deciding whether

50.

Id. at 446.

51. 166 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
52. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 447 n.6 (La. 1975). (emphasis added). See also 2 H.L.
Mazeaud & J. Mazeaud, Traite Theorique et Pratique de la Responsabilite Civile no. 1160
(6th ed. 1979); Verlander, supra note 49.
53. Goudchaux v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 407 So.2d 1317 (La. App. 3d.
Cir. 1982); Cardwell v. Jefferson Rentals, 379 So.2d 255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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the lessor's "garde" over the thing had been terminated, considered it
important to determine whether the lessor retained any right to maintain,
repair, or inspect the thing while in the possession of the lessee and the
amount of time the lessee had the thing in his physical possession before
the damage occurred. 4 Thus, the courts seemed to place heavy emphasis
on the lessor's continuing ability to prevent the thing from causing harm
even though in the hands of the lessee.
This emphasis upon the lessor's ability to prevent the thing from causing harm supports the argument that a parent should not be held liable
if he does not have the power to enforce his authority over the child
by demanding his physical custody. Significantly, in the lease cases, the
lessor voluntarily surrendered the leased item to the lessee. Yet the court
nevertheless examined remnants of physical custody in the lessor. As
discussed above, although in some cases the joint custody plan simply
embodies a voluntary agreement between the parents allocating physical
custody between them, in most cases the parents are unable to agree on
physical custody and therefore the allocation of custody is imposed by
the court on an involuntary basis. If the court in the lease cases, which
involved voluntary surrender of custody, stressed remnants of physical
custody retained by the lessor, then by even stronger reasoning physical
custody, or the right to demand physical custody, should be essential to
parental liability under a joint custody plan mandating involuntary surrender of custody.
Arguably, the inclusion of the "residing with" clause in article 2318,
holding parents liable for the damage caused by children "residing with
them," was originally intended to impose liability on the parent only if
he had the right and physical ability to discipline the child. Furthermore,
the court's policy in applying article 2317 was that the guardian of the
thing should bear the loss rather than an innocent person;" but under
a joint custody plan there are two guardians or tutors, and arguably it
is more equitable to impose liability upon the physical custodian since
he or she is best able to prevent the child from causing harm.
However, the argument against the necessity of physical custody as
a prerequisite to liability under article 2318 is that the language in the
Digest of 1808 relieving the parents of liability if they could not have
prevented the act was deleted when the code of 1825 was adopted.5 6 Additionally, as discussed above, the language of article 2317 imposes liability
for "things in our custody" while liability for persons is placed on those

54. Goudchaux, 407 So. 2d at 1320; Cardwell, 379 So. 2d at 257.
55. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 446. The court in Loescher declared, "Thus, the person
to whom society allots the supervision, care, or guardianship (custody) of the risk-creating
person or thing bears the loss resulting from creation of the risk, rather than some innocent
third person harmed as a consequence of his failure to prevent the risk."
56. See supra note 16.
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who are "answerable," implying liability based purely on relationships
between persons without regard to issues of custody.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the "residing with" clause in article 2318, which literally can be interpreted to mean physical residence or
custody, has been interpreted by the courts to mean legal residence or
domicile, thus implying that physical custody is irrelevant. Even though
arguably the custodial parent in fairness should bear the full loss caused
by the child since he or she can enforce disciplinary decisions, that equity
can still be achieved by imposing liability on both parents and allowing
the noncustodial parent to seek indemnification from the custodial parent.
In view of the modern tort policy of insuring maximum sources of financial responsibility to the innocent victim, the better policy appears to be
that of placing liability on the noncustodial parent for damage caused
by his minor children and then determining independently the liability of
the parents inter se based upon relative parental negligence, which parent
had physical custody at the time of the tortious act, or agreement in the
joint custody plan apportioning liability.
Article 2321
An analogy can also be drawn between article 2318 and article 2321,
which imposes liability for damage caused by animals. The language in
article 2321 that "[tihe owner of an animal is answerable for the damage
he has caused"" parallels the language in article 2318: "damage occasioned by their minor unemancipated children.""
The most recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision interpreting article 2321, Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Coop., Inc.," held the
owner of a bull strictly liable even though the animal was not in the
owner's physical custody. The court stated that since an animal is a thing,
article 2321 is a modification of article 2317, and that if custody or garde
were a prerequisite to an owner's liability for damage caused by his animal
then the language of article 2321 would be superfluous. The court did
not discuss the ability or inability of the owner to supervise and prevent
the damage, basing its decision on the policy that the owner (risk-creator)
should bear the loss caused by the animal rather than an innocent third
party victim.
By analogy, the parents' physical custody, or more importantly, the
right to demand physical custody of the child, may be irrelevant in determining parental liability under article 2318. The court in Rozell stressed
that under article 2321 liability for damage caused by an animal is derived
from the fact of ownership, not custody, and concluded that "by en57. La. Civ. Code art. 2321.
58. La. Civ. Code art. 2318.
59. 434 So. 2d 404 (La. 1983).
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trusting the animal to another custodian the owner does not escape
responsibility." 6 Thus, both articles 2318 and 2321, as interpreted, appear to impose liability based on relationships. Article 2321 imposes liability
on the owner of an animal because of his status as owner, regardless
of who has custody of the animal; under article 2318, liability arises from
the specific relationship between parent and child. The analogy is drawn
closer in that animals, although things, are animate, freely moving objects which can cause damage (much like children) if not properly supervised. Carrying out the analogy between articles 2318 and 2321, liability
under article 2318 arguably should be imposed on the noncustodial parent
in joint custody cases based on his continuing legal status as parent or
cotutor of the child.
Article 2320
Article 2320 makes masters, employers, teachers and artisans
answerable for damage caused by those in their care." As in the case
of parent or tutor and child, liability under article 2320 is imposed
vicariously by virtue of a relationship between persons (master/servant,
employer/employee, teacher/student, artisan/apprentice), and consequently
these persons are liable for damage caused by those under their care.
Although article 2320 on its face relieves these persons of liability if they
could not have prevented the act,62 the jurisprudence has generally written out the exculpating clause in article 2320 and instead inquires into
the overall relationship of the parties. 3 The failure to apply the exculpating
clause is probably due to the fact that when the exculpating clause was
adopted, masters or employers had close supervision over their servants
and could control their behavior. Today, by contrast, a single employer
may have many employees in different cities making it virtually impossible to supervise them closely, if at all. Thus, by necessity the exculpating
clause had to be ignored since under the statute as written few modern
employers would be held liable for the acts of their employees. Modern
judicial construction of article 2320 thus bases liability on the relationship between employer and employee rather than on supervision, thereby
shifting the policy goal from deterrence to financial responsibility. Since
the exculpating clause in article 2318 was intentionally removed by the
legislature, the logic for imposing liability based upon the relationship

60. Id. at 408. The court in Rozell stated: "One who entrusts his animal to another
does so at his own risk, although any fault or negligence on the part of the custodian
would entitle the owner to indemnity." Id. Thus, again by analogy, the noncustodial parent
could be held liable and allowed indemnification from the custodial parent.
61. La. Civ. Code art. 2320.
62. The last paragraph in article 2320 states, "In the above cases, responsibility only
attaches, when the masters or employers, teachers and artisans, might have prevented the
act which caused the damage, and have not done it."
63. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902, 905 (1968).
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between parent and child rather than upon supervision is even stronger.
As with article 2318 vis-a-vis children who have reached the age of discernment, article 2320 imposes vicarious liability upon a class of persons
(employers) for the acts of other persons "for whom they are answerable."
Article 2319
A very close analogy can be drawn between the parent or tutor in
article 2318 and the curator in article 2319 who is responsible for the
acts of insane persons under his care."' The functions of the curator and
the tutor are quite similar; both care for persons who in the eyes of the
law are incapable of caring for themselves. Code of Civil Procedure article 4554 states that "the relationship between an interdict and his curator
is the same as that between a minor and his tutor, with respect to the
' 65
person and property of the interdict.
Significantly, liability may well be appropriately imposed on the
curator based solely on his relationship to the insane person, without regard
to physical custody. The curator usually cannot force the insane person
into his physical custody, as a parent may do with his minor child, since
the insane person is usually committed to a mental hospital where the
curator would have no control over him. Ultimately the court has the
power to determine who shall have custody of the interdict, 66 as the judge
is given complete discretion in controlling the person of the interdict. He
may order the interdict to be attended in his home or a hospital. The
court in Turner, in dicta, indicated that liability is imposed on the curator
because of the formal, legal relationship between the curator and the insane person.6 7 The Turner dicta again emphasized the policy of insuring
the injured person of a source of financial responsibility for the damage
caused by the insane person. Under the policy of financial responsibility,
the curator should retain garde, or legal custody, over the insane person
even when the curator loses physical custody of him, and thus should
remain liable even when the insane person causes damage while commit-

64. La. Civ. Code art. 2319. This article is unique in Louisiana law. No similar article
appeared in the French civil codes, and it did not appear in Louisiana until the enactment
of the Civil Code of 1825. Turner, 308 So. 2d at 275. In other states the guardian's liability
for the insane is predicated on negligence. 39 Am Jur. Guardian & Ward § 188, at 190 (1968).
65. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4554. See also La. Civ. Code art. 39 (stating that domicile
of minor and interdict is that of tutor and curator respectively); Code of Civil Procedure
articles 4549, 4550, 4553, and 4555 also make reference to the articles on tutorship.
66. La. Code Civ. P. art 4555.
67. Turner, 308 So. 2d at 274. Turner stated: "Nevertheless an innocent victim should
not be denied reparation if there exists a source of financial responsibility; therefore, the
. . . curator of an insane person who [is] charged with a legal 'garde' or care of these
persons who cannot care for themselves, should also be required to respond for the acts
of those within their 'garde' because of their legal relation to and legal responsibility for
these nondiscerning persons." Id.
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ted to a mental hospital or while otherwise out of the curator's physical
custody.8
If the curator is held responsible for the acts of the insane person
without the right to have him in his custody, by analogy, a cotutor who
does not have the right to physical custody of the child for a certain period
of time under a joint custody plan should also bear the responsibility
for the child's acts. This analogy is supported by the common functions
of both curators and tutors (to care for those unable to care for themselves)
and by the Code of Civil Procedure articles on curators, which refer to
the tutorship articles when detailing the duties of the curator. Additionally, the underlying policy of financial responsibility is common to both
articles 2318 and 2319.
Articles 2317-2322 all have different origins for the imputation of
liability for damaging acts, but the common thread in the articles, as interpreted, is that liability is not based upon fault; rather liability is imposed based upon a relationship which exists between the person or thing
causing the damage and the one held answerable. Under article 2317 the
courts have been willing to impose liability on the guardian of a thing
even when he has voluntarily surrendered it by leasing it to another. Article 2321 imposes liability on the owner of an animal based on his status
as owner even when the animal is not in his physical custody. Article
2320 imposes liability on employers and masters based on their relationship to their employees and servants, without regard to physical supervision. Article 2319 imposes liability on the curator, whose duties are similar
to the tutor, for acts caused by an insane person. The common policy
underlying the judicial interpretations of these articles is that an innocent
third party victim should not be denied sources of financial responsibility. If the above articles impose liability without regard to the right to
physical custody of the thing or person, the same principle arguably should
be applied to article 2318: the noncustodial parent, as cotutor or legal
custodian under a joint custody plan, should be liable for the damage
caused by his minor child. Any unfairness or undue hardship placed on
the noncustodial parent can be alleviated by allowing that parent to obtain indemnification or contribution from the parent with physical custody.
The Nature of the Liability
If both spouses should be held liable under a joint custody plan for

68. Writers prior to the decisions of Turner and Loescher disagreed over whether or
not the curator should be liable without "fault. See Note, Incompetent Persons-Liability
of Curator-Custodian Distinguished, 8 La. L. Rev. 144, 146, (1947) (arguing curator should
be liable without fault but recognizing that other civil law jurisdictions, including Germany,
Japan, Spain, Quebec, hold the curator liable only if he is negligent); see Note, Insane
Persons-Liability in Tort-Liability of Guardian, 21 Tul. L. Rev. 679, 683 (1947) (arguing
fault should be required).
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the damage caused by their minor children, the remaining issue is the
nature of that liability, whether it be joint, several or in solido. Article
2091 states that "[tihere is an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to the same thing ...
"69 Under a joint
custody plan, given the construction of article 2318 above-that as cotutors
both parents should be liable for the damage caused by their unemancipated children-the parents arguably are codebtors liable for the same
debt. However, according to article 2093, solidarity cannot be presumed
but must be either expressly stipulated or provided for by law.7"
For solidarity to take place of right some statute must provide for
it. One writer has suggested that such an express provision of law is in
Code of Civil Procedure Article 4262, which states: "Natural cotutors
shall be bound in solido except as to damages arising from the administration of all or a part of the minor's property by one of the cotutors individually pursuant to an order of the court or an agreement between
the cotutors approved by the court."" However, article 4262 concerns
tutorship over the property of the minor, not tutorship over the person,
and apparently concerns only the cotutors' liability to the minor for the
improper administration of the minor's property. It is thus doubtful that
article 4262 could serve as a basis for solidary liability to third persons
for acts of a tutor's ward.
However, the supreme court in Foster v. Hampton" has drawn into
question the requirement of article 2093 that solidarity must be expressly
stipulated or provided for by law. In Foster, the court held that the
employee who injured a third party was liable in solido with his employer,
who was vicariously responsible for his actions under article 2320, even
though no statute expressly stated that solidarity should be imposed. After
Foster, arguably one should not have to prove that some provision of
law holds the parties liable in solido; one need only show that both parties share liability for the damage the minor child has caused.73
This imposition of solidary liability under the Foster reasoning is supported by article 250, which provides that parents, as cotutors, are to
share equal responsibility for the child, and by the last sentence in article
2318: "The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors."' 4

69. La. Civ. Code art. 2091.
70. La. Civ. Code art. 2093.
71. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4262 (Supp. 1984); Comment, Joint Custody in Louisiana,
43 La. L. Rev. 85, 113 (1982).
72. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980) (adopting Justice Tate's concurring opinion in Wooten
v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973)).
73. See Kern v. Travelers Ins. Co. 407 So. 2d 2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (holding
that son who committed the delict and his father were solidary obligors).
74. La. Civ. Code art. 2318, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 578, § 1.
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Contribution and Indemnification
If both parents are held liable in solido under article 2318 in joint
custody situations, various methods of sharing that responsibility as between the parents are possible. First, as discussed above, article 250 states
that when joint custody is awarded both parents become cotutors with
equal privileges and responsibilities. 75 This implies that the liability of the
parents inter se should be by virile shares.
However, article 250 also provides that both parents should have equal
responsibilities "unless modified by order of the court or by an agreement of the parents approved by the court." 7 For instance, the parents
may provide in the joint custody plan that the parent with actual physical
custody of the child will be solely liable when the child injures someone.
Such a stipulation should affect only contribution rights between the
parents and should not affect the right of the injured victim to sue both
parents.
If the liability between the spouses is solidary, various combinations
of contribution or indemnification may be used. These combinations may
arise in the following situations: (1) when neither parent is negligent, (2)
when one parent is negligent and not the other, and (3) when both parents
are negligent.
The first category, where neither parent is negligent, is the most likely
situation to occur. Since in most cases neither parent is at fault for the
child's acts, some criterion is needed to allocate the loss between the nonnegligent parents. As discussed above, if the noncustodial parent is held
liable to third parties for the minor's acts without the practical ability
to enforce disciplinary decisions by demanding physical custody, a harsh
result is achieved. This harsh result can be alleviated by allowing the noncustodial parent to recover full indemnification from the custodial parent
who has the ability to enforce the disciplinary decisions. Thus, as between the parents, the loss should be imposed on the parent or tutor with
actual physical custody and control over the minor. Significantly, the
language of article 2318 supports this right of full indemnification against
the parent with physical custody. The parent without physical custody
under the joint custody plan "reserves recourse" under article 2318 against
the physical custodian in whose care the child has been placed. At the
same time the victim is assured an additional source of financial responsibility by being able to recover from the legal custodian without physical
custody.7
75. La. Civ. Code art. 250 (Supp. 1984).
76. La. Civ. Code art. 250 (Supp. 1984)..
77. See also Civ. Code art. 2106 ("If the affair for which the debt has been contracted
in solido, concern only one of the coobligors in solido, that one is liable for the whole
debt towards the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as his
sureties.").
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However, if negligent supervision is involved, clearly equity requires
that indemnification should be based on the negligence of the supervising
parent. Thus, in the second category, if one parent is not negligent and
is cast in judgment and can prove that the damage resulted solely from
negligent supervision by the other parent, then the parent cast in judgment should be permitted to seek full indemnification from the other
negligent parent. Article 2103 provides that "[i]f the obligation arises from
an offense or a quasi-offense, it shall be divided in proportion to each
debtor's fault.""8 If the parent ordered to pay can show the other parent
was 100 percent at fault, he should be entitled to full indemnification.
Again, the language of article 2318 itself-"placed by them under the
care of other persons, reserving recourse" 7"-supports full indemnification. If the mother has physical custody and the child injures another
due to the mother's negligent supervision of the child, the father should
be able to get full recovery from the mother.
In the final category, if both parents are negligent when the minor
injures another, article 2103 would require that the parents as codebtors
divide the debt according to the proportion of each parent's fault.
Conclusion
Since joint custody plans are becoming more popular, the issues
presented above are more likely to arise. The underlying policy of joint
custody is the sharing of the physical and legal custody of the parent's
children. The intent is that even though the parents have terminated their
marital relationship, they should not end their relationship with their
children. The parents should continue to share the responsibilities of the
upbringing of their children, one of which is the responsiblity placed upon
them by article 2318 as parents or cotutors.
The jurisprudence places paramount importance on the formal legal
relationship between the parent or tutor and the child. Also of importance is society's goal of insuring innocent victims adequate sources of
financial responsibility. Under this analysis parental liability under a joint
custody plan should not depend on physical custody or the right to demand physical custody. Obviously, in achieving these goals neither the
legislature nor the courts contemplated a tutor or parent without the right
to demand physical custody to enforce continuing parental rights over
minor children.
Thus, it is proposed that this problem be confronted and that article
2318 be amended to impose liability on both cotutors under a joint custody
plan regardless of who has physical custody of the child at the time the
damage occurs. Article 2318 would then be in harmony with article 250
78.
79.

La. Civ. Code art. 2103.
La. Civ. Code art. 2318, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 578, § 1.
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in that both parents (as cotutors) would share equal responsibilities for
the child.
In addition, it is proposed that article 4261 of Code of Civil Procedure be amended to expressly state that cotutors liable under article
2318 be bound in solido. Article 4261 should also be amended to state
that cotutors may provide by an agreement approved by the court for
indemnification or contribution between them. Such action would clear
up any confusion that may exist in the law of joint custody and article
2318 and will ensure that the interaction of joint custody laws and tort
law in Louisiana will be harmonious.
George Davis Ernest, III

